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ON STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
FANCY THEORIES OF INTERPRETATION
AREN'T
LARRY ALEXANDER7
We are awash in fancy theories of statutory interpretation. The latest one
to come to my attention-and it is notable only because it is, as it claims
to be, so typical of the genre-is that proposed by Jane Schachter in the
Harvard Law Review.' Professor Schachter, like fellow fancy theorists
Eskridge,2 Frickey,3 Sunstein,4 Dworkin,' and many others,6 attacks the
unfancy intentionalist model with the now boringly familiar claims about
the conceptual difficulties of aggregating the individual intentions of multi-
member legislatures, applying intentions to changed and unforeseen
circumstances, and determining the level of generality at which intentions
should be characterized. At times, echoing claims made by the others listed
above, she appears to deny altogether the facticity of the legislators' inten-
tions: There is no "there" there to which the intentionalist theory of
interpretation can refer. The meaning of statutes is not a fact but is a
normative construct based on one's favorite normative principles. One
interprets a statute "as if' it had been written by an idealized republican
deliberative body, by Hercules, by one who wants to cabin the influence of
special interests, etc.
* Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. Visiting
Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Fall, 1995. B.A. Williams College (1965);
LL.B. Yale Law School (1968).
I. Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory
Interpretation, 108 HARv. L. REV. 593 (1995).
2. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1985).
3. See Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321
(1990)
4. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REv. 405
(1989).
5. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAw'S EMpRE 313-54 (1986); Ronald Dworkin, Bork's Jurisprudence,
57 U. CHI. L. Rrv. 657 (1990).
6. See generally Larry Alexander, All or Nothing at All? The Intentions of Authorities and the
,4uthoritv of Intentions, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION 357-404 (Andrei Marmor ed., forthcoming 1995).
1081
Washington University Open Scholarship
1082 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
The problems with fancy theories are that they are not theories of
interpretation, they are not internally consistent, and they are not held
sincerely. They are not theories of interpretation because they impose what
the interpreter wants the statute to mean on the statute qua words (or
marks). If I know what the legislature should have determined (according
to my favorite republican theory, Rawlsian principles, contemporary values,
etc.), the fancy theories let me claim that the statute in fact means what it
should have meant. The statute, in short, is dispensable. But if it's
dispensable, how can I be interpreting it?7
The fancy theories are internally inconsistent because they never really
let go of legislative intent at the same time they are denying its existence.
What marks count as "the statute"? Why, those the legislature intended. Is
the statute-are the marks-written in English? Well, yes, if that's what the
legislature intended. Somehow the problems with legislative intentions
don't stand in the way of determining what marks count as the statute and
in what language the statute is written. But if the legislature can have
linguistic intentions, and if we should be bound by those, why can it not
have substantive intentions that should also bind us?8
The lack of sincerity in fancy theories is given away by the fancy
theorists when they hedge their fancy theories by applying them only if the
statute is not otherwise clear or unambiguous. Schachter again and again,
after denying there is anything to statutes except what the fancy theories
construct, says things such as the fancy theory is to be used "to resolve
ambiguity" or "to choose from among competing, plausible interpretations."
Well, ambiguity is an epistemic complaint that suggests a meaning
currently hidden from view by, say, an unfortunate choice of words. An
ambiguity does not suggest the absence of an intended meaning but only
a lack of clarity about that meaning. Nor is imposing an external set of
values resolving an ambiguity. And how can we limit fancy theories to
choosing among "plausible interpretations" when all interpretations are the
products of the fancy theories? If plausibility comes from what we know
about legislative intent, then there is a "there" there after all.9
Fancy "as if' theories of interpretation aren't theories of interpretation.
They are attempts to trade on the authority of statutes to enact the
interpreter's own preferences and to treat the world of brute fact-what the
legislature determined ought to be done-as though it is nothing more than
7. See id. at 400.
8. See id. at 365, 378-79.
9. See id. at 394-95.
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what the interpreter thinks it ought to be. Fancy theories have a place per-
haps in determining the limits of legislative authority, the presumptions
through which legislation should be filtered for external policy reasons, and
the rules that should apply whenever a statute fails to be meaningful
(perhaps because it is the product of inconsistent or nonaggregable
intentions)."0 However, although fancy theories in these ways can be
theories about statutes, they are not theories of statutory interpretation. And
in their slips of the tongue, the fancy theorists reveal that even they know
this.
10. See id. at 382-91; Larry Alexander, Practical Reason and Statutory Interpretation, 12 LAW
& PHIL. 319, 325-27 (1993).
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